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1. Introduction
Much of the empirical research in finance over the last decade has con-
cerned the subject of market efficiency. The findings, which are usually based
on investigations of the two major exchanges in the United States, indicate
that, by and large, these securities markets are efficient: every price in these
markets reflects all the available information so that any new relevant informa-
tion is rapidly impounded in prices and cannot be used to generate returns in
excess of those commensurate with the risk. This property, informational
efficiency, is necessary for the functioning of a capital market as a conduit to
optimal allocation of resources [1].
It has been recognized in the financial literature that the existence of
informational efficiency does not necessarily imply the existence of allocational
efficiency [2]. However, reliance on the existence of informational efficiency as
an indication of allocational efficiency might still be appropriate if certain
market elements exist. These elements include the uninterrupted flow of
financial information, the capability of investors to digest and properly evaluate
the information, and the existence of a technically and legally developed
exchange mechanism. These conditions are present in the major securities
markets in the United States, where there are an abundance of financial
information (both regulated and voluntary), numerous information dissemina-
tors, a deversity of financial advisory services, and a very smooth and long-
standing mechanism of trading. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the
results of the standard informational efficiency tests were generally interpreted
as indicating optimal allocation of resources (with, perhaps, one reservation
concerning the relatively high transaction costs). Nonetheless, in many other
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securities markets the quality of information, the sophistication of investors,
and the trading mechanism impede optimal resource allocation.
There are also good reasons to believe that at least some of the securities
markets in the United States are less developed than the major markets in
terms of information availability and quality, sophistication of investors and
trading mechanism, and therefore, produce non-optimal resource allocation.
First, many of the disclosure regulations apply only to companies above a
certain size. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires periodic
reporting only from companies with total assets over $1,000,000 and a single
class of equity securities with more than 500 holders. Moreover, specific
disclosure requirements are limited to large firms (e.g. the disclosure of current
information required by the rescinded ASR 190 and by FASB 33).
Secondly, financial disseminators and analysts give only sparse coverage to
small and lightly traded securities. More than 10,000 companies have securities
registered with the SEC. Of these about 3,500 are listed on registered stock
exchanges and only a few hundred are followed by financial analysts and
brokerage houses [3]. Only about 1,500 companies are referenced by the Wall
Street Journal Index. These circumstances indicate that the investing public
lacks easy access to detailed financial information on many firms and cannot
obtain regular and thorough analysis of their operations.
Finally, recent studies cast some doubt on the propriety of inferring from
the traditional tests of informational efficiency the existence of optimal re-
source allocation, even in very developed stock exchanges. The studies point to
a persistent under-pricing or over-pricing of securities or groups of securities
over long periods [4]. It appears, therefore, that analysis of the conditions
(aside from "fair-game") that ensure correct determination of securities prices
might also be of great importance for the understanding and improvement of
the most developed securities markets.
This study closely examines the structure, characteristics, and operation of
the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE), a market which proved to be "efficient"
by the standard tests for informational efficiency, yet apparently fails to reflect
properly the correct value of shares and, therefore, fails to perform its function
of optimal allocation of resources. The underlying factors that contribute to
this failure are studied and the implications for more developed stock markets
are drawn.
The examination of the Israeli situation raises the issue of regulation of
information disclosure, i.e. what disclosure should be required and the degree
to which market forces should be relied upon for the supply of information.
This issue arises because the concept of informational efficiency is not very
useful in assessing the economic contribution of a stock market unless it is
related to the underlying information set. Informationally correct prices that
are based on wrong or grossly inadequate information are hardly satisfactory.
The amount, quality, and availability of financial information are thus im-
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portant ingredients of a properly functioning stock market.
Examination of the Israeli capital market indicates that the contention that
free market forces will produce the optimal amount of information and that
therefore less or even no regulation of financial disclosure is required, though
perhaps valid for very developed capital markets, is unwarranted for less
developed markets, characterized by the presence of institutional, social, and
legal constraints which impede the work of free market forces.
The organization of this article is as follows. Section 2 provides a descrip-
tion of the TASE. Section 3 reviews briefly the empirical evidence which
indicates that the TASE is efficient according to the standard tests that are
usually employed for this purpose. The following section presents and analyzes
several examples which demonstrate that despite its technical efficiency, stocks
on the TASE are incorrectly priced and that as a result this market fails to
yield optimal resource allocation. Section 5 offers some explanations of this
coexistence of what we define as informational efficiency and allocational
inefficiency. Section 6 focuses on the comparison between the extent, quality.
and dissemination of financial information in Israel and the United States and
discusses these attributes as determinants of market efficiency, evaluating the
desirability of relying on market forces rather than on regulation for the supply
of corporate disclosure. The final section presents a summary and implications
for disclosure regulation.
2. The Israeli stock market - some background
The TASE is the only organized securities exchange in Israel. Securities of
101 companies are listed on the exchange. Each security is traded once a day.
Orders are submitted to the officials of the exchange before the beginning of
each trading day. When there is an excess demand (supply) the price is raised
(lowered) until the new sell (buy) orders from the presenting members of the
exchange close the gap. All orders are executed at the new equilibrium price.
Investors in the TASE can assume only long positions; short sale transactions
are not performed on the exchange. There are no official market-makers on the
TASE. The absence of these intermediaries contributes to the volatility and
therefore to the speculative nature of narrowly traded stocks. For example, an
excess demand of only $5,000 could increase the price of about a third of the
stocks on the TASE by 3% or more [5]. It is not surprising therefore that
speculators find the TASE a very attractive ground for their activity. The
board of the TASE is quite concerned about this situation and is currently
considering the introduction of market-makers to the trading of stocks with
low marketability.
Table I provides some facts about developments in the Israeli securities
market. These facts show that the importance of the stock market as an object
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of investment to individuals and a source of new capital to corporations has
been increasing in recent years to the point that during 1978, the volume of
trade was IL 14,296 million and IL 5,393 million worth of new stocks were
issued. (The average exchange rate during 1978 was IL 17.5 = $1.)
3. Empirical evidence on the efficiency of the TASE
The efficiency of the TASE has been extensively tested in recent years. The
tests were similar to those performed for the American securities markets and
covered all three forms of market efficiency: the weak form of market
efficiency which states that current prices reflect all the information about past
prices and trading volume, the semi-strong form of market efficiency which
states that current prices reflect all the publicly available information, and the
strong form of market efficiency which states that the market is efficient to all
(not just public) information [6].
3.1. Weak-form efficiency tests
The tests of weak-form efficiency usually involve a search for systematic
patterns in the series of past prices. If such patterns are detected, the hypothe-
sis of weak-form efficiency is rejected. Virtually all studies conducted on the
U.S. stock exchanges failed to detect such patterns. This does not mean that
there are no sequences of price changes in the same direction over several days,
weeks, or months, but rather that the frequency of these events does not exceed
the frequency that would be observed under a truly random process. The
findings therefore led to the conclusion that the tested markets were efficient in
the weak form.
The results of the weak-form tests performed on TASE are very similar to
those found for the exchanges in the United States [7], and appear to support
the weak form of market efficiency hypothesis [8].
3.2. Semi-strong form efficiency tests
Unlike the weak form of the efficiency hypothesis, which asserts only that
security prices do not tend to follow established patterns, the semi-strong
efficient market hypothesis asserts that all available, relevant, public informa-
tion is fully reflected in security prices.
The TASE was tested for the semi-strong form of market efficiency by
examining the change in stock prices during ex-cash dividend and ex-stock
dividend days [9]. In an efficient stock market a strategy of buying a stock on
the day preceding the ex- day and selling it on the ex- day should not generate
abnormal returns. On the TASE such a strategy yielded abnormal returns of
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1.3% and 0.4% per transaction for cash and stock dividends, respectively [10].
Those results indicate some inefficiency which, because of transaction costs, is
nevertheless insufficient to provide a profitable strategy to investors.
The reaction of the TASE to stock dividend announcements was also
examined [11]. The results showed that on the day following the announcement
(trading on TASE is suspended on the day of the announcement) the compa-
nies that declared stock dividends yielded an abnormal return of 4.6%.
However, after the first day no significant abnormal returns could be detected
(-1.0% and 0.0% were observed during the second and third days following
the announcement) [12]. Therefore, public information on stock dividends
could not be utilized to gain an abnormal return, but an insider could benefit
from stock dividend announcements. These results, showing a short reaction
period of less than a week following dividend announcements, are very similar
to the results of an examination of the reaction of New York Stock Exchange
companies to stock splits [13].
3.3. Strong-form efficiency tests
The strong-form market efficiency hypothesis states that all information is
reflected in stock prices. Common sense suggests that such an extreme hy-
pothesis should be refutable. Indeed, one study pointed out that specialists on
the New York Stock Exchange apparently use their monopolistic access to
information concerning unfilled limit orders to generate monopolistic profits
[14], and another study found evidence indicating that officers of corporations
sometimes have monopolistic access to valuable information about their firms
[15]. Similar results were found in the TASE. One study examined the
movement of stock prices in the TASE before the release of "good news" such
as high cash or stock dividends [16]. That evidence showed that stock prices
started to adjust at least twenty days before the announcement, thus giving an
insider the opportunity to generate an abnormal return of about 3% by buying
stock twenty days before the announcement and holding it until one day
before the announcement.
That specialists and some insiders can earn trading profits from their
information refutes the strong form of market efficiency and raises an im-
portant question: How far down through the investment community do
deviations from the model permeate? To answer this question the performance
of various groups of market "professionals" should be examined. Because there
are limited data, only one group has been studied in depth: managers of
open-end mutual funds. A 1969 study found that mutual fund managers do
not seem to possess knowledge that is not already impounded in the securities
prices [171. Similar results were reported in 1977 [18] and in 1978 [19] for the
TASE. These studies revealed that mutual funds could not generate abnormal
returns for their investors.
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3.4. Suminaty
All of the traditional efficiency tests performed on the TASE yielded results
similar to those obtained for securities markets in the United States and
indicated a high degree of informational efficiency. The following analysis of
the Israeli stock market indicates that the results of these tests are of limited
importance in assessing the degree of allocational efficiency.
4. Evidence inconsistent with allocational efficiency
This section provides evidence of clear and unambiguous instances of
incorrect pricing of securities in the TASE, indicating allocational inefficiency.
While we do not pretend to fully explain each one of these apparent anomalies,
the next section discusses institutional and information-related explanations of
the phenomena.
4.1. Improper pricing of individual stocks
A 1978 study by Barnea evaluated the share prices of major Israeli banks
[201. The results showed that after correcting for inflationary effects, their real
EPS had been steadily decreasing over the last six years at an average annual
rate of about 10%. By employing different valuation techniques and by
considering return and risk on alternative investments, Barnea reached the
conclusion that these bank stocks were over-priced by at least 100%. He traced
the over-pricing to the inability of investors to properly analyze the financial
statements, to the widely held yet unsubstantiated beliefs about the immunity
of the banking system in Israel to political upheaval, and to the immense
trading power of the banks which enables them to artificially maintain high
prices for their shares over long periods. This last phenomenon is explored in
the next section.
Our 1981 study examined the accounting issues raised by the financial
reporting of a large Israeli construction company [211. The company reported
poor results for the last few years and its stock price declined, particularly after
a loss was reported for 1978. The loss prompted the resignation of the
company's chairman of the board and its general manager. Careful examina-
tion of the financial reports, including comprehensive adjustment of the
accounts for the effects of inflation, showed that the company was quite
profitable and the reported loss of $2 million obscured a real net income of
about $10 million. One year later the company was sold, causing a jump of
1,000% in the price of its shares. Our analysis indicates that investors and
analysts, as well as members of the board, were all unable to evaluate properly
financial information, thus causing the stock to be grossly under-priced.
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In 1979, Sadan examined the reaction of the Israeli stock market to a weekly
column in the financial section of Ha'aretz, a leading Israeli daily newspaper
[22]. The column analyzes the recent financial statements of a TASE company
and is based totally on publicly available information. The column is published
about one month after the release of the financial statements. Contributors to
the column include academicians in the fields of accounting and finance, as
well as leading business analysts. Sadan analyzed the effect of the column over
a period of time by characterizing the content of specific columns as favorable
or unfavorable. Although the column is based only on publicly available
information, the analysis revealed a significant market reaction in the expected
direction, indicating the prevalence of prolonged over- or under-pricing of
stocks in the TASE, which does not disappear automatically through the
operation of market forces. It should be noted, however, that the adjustment
was very fast. For columns with favorable content, virtually all the adjustment
was made during the first trading day following the publication of the column.
For columns with unfavorable content, the adjustment lasted for three days
[23].
4.2. Pricing of warrants
The terms of warrants in Israel, coupled with the high rate of inflation and
the relatively low dividend yield, make their eventual conversion a certainty
[24]. With very few exceptions all warrants issued have indeed been converted
into common stocks. The purchase of an Israeli warrant can thus be regarded
as the equivalent of purchasing the stock through a loan in an amount equal to
the exercise price. The cost of this loan to the borrower should be at least the
nominal risk-free rate. However, computation of the implicit interest rate of
each of the warrants shows that for less than a third of the warrants the
interest cost was below 20%, for two-thirds of the warrants the rate was below
30%, and it was greater than 40% for only 10% of the warrants [25]. In an
inflation-ridden economy (100% annual inflation in 1979), characterized by
very high nominal interest rates, these very low rates indicate that warrants on
the TASE are grossly and consistently under-priced, sometimes by more than
20%.
4.3. Pricing of registered versus bearer shares
Israeli corporations typically have more than one class of common stock
outstanding. Two common classes are registered shares and bearer shares. The
two classes have exactly the same voting and distribution rights and the same
residual claim on assets. They differ in only one respect: the registered shares
are listed by owners' names in the corporation's books, whereas the identities
of owners of the bearer shares are kept anonymous. Presumably, anonymity is
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important to investors involved in some form of tax evasion. However, the
anonymity of most holders of bearer shares is not maintained since their shares
are held in trust by the trust departments of banks which prepare their own
lists of holders by name. Furthermore, the Income Tax Commission (the Israeli
IRS) has other means of identifying holders of securities. For instance, it can
gain access to the records of the banks or other members of the exchange
through which the transaction was processed. In short, the two types of shares
are identical for all practical purposes. One would expect them to have the
same market price and to yield the same return.
We examined the fifteen stocks found amoung the industrial, land, and
construction companies listed on the TASE for which there are registered and
bearer classes. Surprisingly, shares of stock in the same company were found to
have a different price and a different systematic risk, depending on whether
they were bearer or registered shares. In thirteen of the fifteen cases it was the
share with the lower marketability (as measured by the volume of transactions)
that, contrary to our expectations, enjoyed the higher price. The price differen-
tial was persistent over the years and quite significant: in five cases it exceeded
5% and in two cases it was greater than 50%. Interviews with investors and
members of the exchange revealed that for reasons that could be described at
best as psychological, they assigned value to the relative rarity of the stocks. In
addition, we found that there was a difference between the systematic risk of
the two classes of shares, as measured by the co-movement of the security's
rate-of-return and the market rate-of-return (referred to as the security f3). The
correlation between the /3's of the two classes (based on two years of weekly
observations) was only 0.56. The difference between the /3's of the two classes
was considerable. For instance, for one pair of classes the /3's for the shares
were 1.58 and 0.94. In another pair the 3's were 0.43 and 0.80. Thus, at least
half of the shares included in the examination were under-priced or over-priced
and no market force worked to eliminate the anomaly.
4.4. Valuation of bonds
Another striking example of market inefficiency existed in the pricing of a
new type of bond issued by the Israeli government in February 1978. This
bond, the option bond as it was called by the government, provided its holders
with the option of selecting retroactively, at maturity, between two modes of
indexation of the principal: 80o linkage to the cost-of-living index, or 100%
linkage to the U.S. dollar. The issuance of the option bonds was accompanied
by an intensive and successful advertising campaign. During the first six
months the government sold about $100 million of the bonds, making it the
most successful issue ever made by the government. The option bonds were
bought not only by individuals but also by institutional investors, who
purchased 50o of the bonds issued during the first six months.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
D. Givoly, J. Lakonishok / Market efficiency
A careful analysis should have revealed that the option bonds were inferior
to other financial assets. A portfolio composed of bonds linked to the cost-of-
living index and bonds linked to the dollar could provide investors with a
higher return than the option bond for any plausible changes in the cost-of-liv-
ing index and in the exchange rate. This straightforward analysis was brought
to the attention of financial analysts in a seminar organized by the Faculty of
Management at Tel-Aviv University, which was held six months after the
option bonds were first issued. Following the seminar, sales of option bonds
stopped almost completely. Nevertheless, the fact stands that for six months
the investing public erred in evaluating a major financial asset.
5. Causes of inefficiency
This section reviews and discusses the institutional, legal, and economic
factors that may account for some of the incidents of allocational inefficiency
in the TASE described in the previous section.
We begin by reviewing the institutional barriers to efficient allocation of
resources and conclude with the important factor of investor sophistication.
The degree of investor sophistication is also related to the basic issues of
regulation: production and disclosure of financial (accounting and other)
information. Because of their prominence these issues are discussed in a
separate section.
5.1. Dominance of the big three banks
Banks function in the TASE as issuers (accounting for 58% of the market
value of new issues in 1978), brokers (who provide advisory and trading
services for 80% of the transactions in shares), and investors (who are major
stockholders in several companies and investors in almost all traded securities).
In addition, banks in Israel manage most of the mutual funds; the investment
of the three major banks in mutual funds represents 88% of the total mutual
fund investment in Israel. There is a strong concentration in Israeli banking:
the three largest banks have 89% of all public deposits and 91% of the
combined assets of the industry. The enormous financial resources of the
banks relative to the size of the TASE might explain how banks maintain an
economically unjustified high price for their own shares [26]. The banks affect
not only the price of their own shares but that of many other shares as well. It
is a common phenomenon in the TASE that banks boost stock prices; in
particular, they artificially generate an atmosphere of a bullish market in
periods preceding their own issuance of new shares.
Because of their size and extensive involvement in the stock market as
shareholders and brokers, as well as bankers, the banks often act to stabilize
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price fluctuations of stocks in which they have some interest. A 1980 study
found that stocks in which banks had a direct interest were much less volatile
than other stocks with the same marketability characteristics [27]. This sta-
bilization action tends to moderate, at least temporarily, the effect of waves of
sales or purchases by small investors. In a way, the banks operate as unofficial
specialists or market-makers for most of the traded stocks.
The influence which banks have on prices and stock market trends might
also be the result of the particular trading mechanism of the TASE, under
which each stock is traded once a day. Before the trade begins, each bank,
acting in its capacity as a member of the exchange, collects and summarizes all
the orders received from its branches, which operate as brokers. The member
bank computes the excess demand or supply of its clients. The bank places its
own order when the excess demand or supply of the clients, as well as the
structure of the limit orders, are known to it. The resulting excess demand or
supply is then submitted to the floor. The trade manager considers the orders
from all members and announces the net excess demand or supply. The gap is
closed by the trade manager gradually changing the price and by the members
(and the members only) placing additional orders. This trading mechanism
gives the banks an obvious edge over regular investors.
As lenders and shareholders of many corporations listed on the TASE, the
banks have access to valuable financial information which is not publicly
available. This information could be used to generate abnormal profits for its
holder. In response to a question in our 1979 study of financial analysts, all
analysts surveyed expressed their view that information is not equitably
distributed to market participants [28]. Whether inside information is actually
being used by banks to enhance their profits is unknown. Yet, the widespread
feeling that banks exploit their superior knowledge tends to discourage inde-
pendent analysis of securities and cultivates speculative behavior.
Many of the banks' activities would be considered clear violations of the
federal securities laws in the United States. In Israel, the pertinent regulations
are quite vague and not strictly enforced. Nonetheless, it appears that price
manipulation is inherent in the TASE trading system and in the structure of
the capital market in Israel. Unless these basic conditions change, no regula-
tion, no matter how tight, will eliminate this imperfection in the market.
5.2. Dominance of indexed bonds
The chronic inflation in Israel, which recently reached an annual rate of
100%, created a new financial instrument - the indexed bond. The bonds,
which are issued by the government, are linked to the cost-of-living index,
guarantee a real rate of return net of tax of about 2% and are traded on the
TASE. Other government-sponsored saving plans which are less liquid offer a
net real interest of up to 5%. Such high, after-tax, risk-free real rates of return
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are not available to U.S. or European investors. The availability of this
instrument is the main reason for the unusually high rate of savings in Israel's
inflation-ridden economy - over 20% of disposable income.
Indexed bonds and indexed savings dominate the stock market for most
risk-averse investors. Only investors with low or no risk aversion find the
TASE an attractive channel of investment. The result is a narrow market
characterized by the prevalence of either institutional investors that can easily
diversify their holdings (within or outside the TASE) or speculators with low
risk aversion. We found that 41% of investors in stocks in Israel made more
than twenty transactions per year [29]. The comparable figure for the United
States is only 20% [30]. Our study also revealed that the objective of 58% of the
investors was short-term capital gain; the objective of another 38% was
long-term capital gain and only 4% regarded dividend income as their prime
investment objective. These results reflect the speculative motives of investors
in Israel. In comparison, the main objective of U.S. investors, according to an
investor survey conducted in 1977, was long-term capital gain [31]. The second
objective in importance was found to be dividend income, while short-term
capital gain was considered the least important of the three [32].
5.3. Disparity between voting rights and ownership rights
For most securities in the United States the voting rights of a common share
are proportional to its par or stated value. The ratio of voting rights to $1 of
par value is identical for all issues of common shares made by the same
corporation. This is not so in Israel: subsequent issues of common shares of
Israeli corporations do not always carry the same voting rights as the original
issue. Typically, the first (founding) issue is senior to subsequent issues with
respect to its voting rights per $1 of par value. By issuing inferior common
shares, original or major shareholders are able to raise new capital from the
public without relinquishing their firm control of the business. Furthermore,
their business decisions are unaffected by the prospect of take-over bids, since
even a large-scale purchase of the inferior shares held by the public is unlikely
to change the control.
As a result, major shareholders and the management of Israeli corporations
are often indifferent to the fate of the stock and to the welfare of the small
shareholders. Some of the actions which are often taken by U.S. corporations
to reduce their investors' risk (e.g. a steady dividend policy or the maintenance
of a voluntary flow of information to the public) are taken by only a few
Israeli corporations. At the same time, the corrective mechanism that take-over
bids might have on stock prices does not exist in the TASE. The disparity
between voting rights and ownership rights thus precludes the existence of
factors which might enhance optimal allocation of resources.
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5.4. Unavailability of short transactions
As pointed out in section 2, short sales are not available to investors in the
TASE. It seems plausible that the absence of short transactions contributes to
allocational inefficiency since investors are unable to act upon incorrect
valuation of securities. The availability of short sales, presumably, might have
eliminated the phenomenon of under-pricing of warrants on the TASE de-
scribed in subsection 4.2: investors could take a short position in the stock and
a long position in the warrant and combine these holdings with a risk-free asset
to form a portfolio which would then be held until the expiration date of the
option. Such a strategy would guarantee an investor an abnormal return. In
addition, a similar strategy based on short transactions might have eliminated
the general under-pricing of other convertible securities in the TASE and the
persistent price differentials found between the economically identical bearer
and the registered shares.
5.5. Degree of market sophistication
The ability of a capital market to operate efficiently so as to bring about
optimal allocation of resources hinges not only upon the amount and quality of
information or on the market organization, but also on the ability of the
market to read the information signals and to interpret them correctly. The
general view is that although most small investors are not knowledgeable
enough to analyze financial data, there is a small group of competent investors
and professional advisors who make the market operate efficiently. The
existence of skilled and competent disseminators of financial information in
the form of financial analysts is widely recognized as a distinct complementary
and essential ingredient of the corporate disclosure system [33]. In fact, it is the
research and analysis by thousands of brokers and financial analysts which
make the market respond rapidly and correctly to new information.
The roles of both the financial analyst and the firm representative are filled
in Israel by securities advisors, most of whom are located at bank branches.
The advisors, who are bank employees, advise the public on a wide range of
investment opportunities, including savings and pension plans, foreign cur-
rency, bonds, and stocks. They are regularly furnished with raw and digested
information by the securities departments of their banks. The latter also
provide their original and continuing training.
Our 1979 questionnaire-type study on Israeli securities advisors reveals that
public reliance on the financial advisor for investment in the stock market is
quite heavy and is similar to that found for registered representatives in the
United States [34]. The following shows the distribution of the answers to the
question: "In what percentage of transactions do you actually make a recom-
mendation to the account?" [35].
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Israel U.S.A.
Under 25% 17% 8%
25-50% 18 21
51-75% 31 35
Over 75% 34 36
Total 100% 100%
Yet, the quality of the advice given by these advisors in Israel, at least that
relating to investment in stocks, leaves much to be desired. The study on Israeli
advisors found, through a series of indirect questions, that most advisors were
incapable of properly interpreting financial statements. Table 2 summarizes the
results, which are based on responses from sixty-eight advisors. About half of
the respondents did not appear to understand the meaning of funds statements
and about 70% were not familiar with accounting for R&D (research and
development), goodwill, or deferred taxes. About 90% of the advisors were
unaware of the exact impact of inflation on historical accounting reports. This
last point represents, in a market characterized by a three-digit inflation (50%
at the time of the survey), an important deficiency in the advisors' perfor-
mance.
Furthermore, unlike his American colleagues, the Israeli financial advisor
does not enjoy the abundant flow of digested information provided by finan-
cial disseminators (such as Standard and Poor's, and Moody's) and must
therefore rely more on his own skills to gather and analyze information. The
ability of the advisors to select and request the right information seems.
nonetheless, doubtful: when asked about the importance of additional infor-
mation, such as a breakdown by segments of business (which is currently
unavailable in Israel), only 20% of the advisors replied that it was "vital" (the
other adjectives offered were "confirmatory" and "interesting"). Quarterly
income statements (also currently unavailable in Israel) were described as
"vital information" by only 55% of the respondents. In the survey of registered
representatives conducted in the United States, segment reporting and quarterly
income statements were defined as "vital" by 80% and 100% of the respon-
dents, respectively [36].
What makes the situation even worse is that many Israeli investors have
little or no knowledge about the securities market. In the survey of registered
representatives conducted in the United States, some 500 representatives were
asked to assess the extent of their clients' knowledge. The same question was
asked in our study on Israeli securities advisors. The following is a comparative
summary of the replies [371.
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Approximately what percentage of your clients: Israel U.S.A.
have a great amount of knowledge about securities? 12% 35%
have some knowledge about securities? 26 48
have little or no knowledge about securities? 62 17
Total 100% 100%
The evidence for Israel suggests that as far as investment in the stock market is
concerned, largely unknowledgeable investors rely heavily on the advice of
unsophisticated financial advisors. As a result, available relevant financial
information is mis-interpreted or completely ignored, thus causing wrong
investment decisions, incorrect pricing of securities, and non-optimal alloca-
tion of resources.
6. Regulation of financial disclosure
The financial disclosure system in Israel is similar to that of the United
States in terms of the minimum standards of disclosure, the accounting
principles on which financial statements are based, and the conceptual ap-
proach of relying on public (rather than private) regulation. There are, how-
ever, two main differences. One relates to the extent of disclosure required:
much less disclosure is required from Israeli companies; the other difference is
with respect to the degree of active regulatory intervention: the SEC is much
more active in setting disclosure rules and in monitoring compliance than its
Israeli counterpart.
The law governing corporate disclosure in Israel is the Securities Law of
1968, which established the Israeli Securities Authority (ISA) and delegated to
it the power to introduce new reporting requirements (subject to formal
approval of the Parliament's Finance Committee). The ISA reviews and
approves prospectuses and supervises the operation of the TASE. Unlike the
SEC, the ISA does not have investigative authority nor has it prosecutory
power. These functions are filled by the Office of the General Attorney. About
120 corporations file prospectuses with the ISA and, with few exceptions, all of
them are listed on the TASE. The ISA employs thirty workers, half of whom
are accountants and lawyers.
6.1. Disclosure requirements
The disclosure requirements for prospectuses filed with the ISA are quite
similar to those for U.S. companies. The differences between U.S. and Israeli
regulations are found in the disclosure required in periodic reports. Certain
requirements under U.S. law do not exist in the Israeli Securities Law and have
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not been made by the ISA. These requirements and the implications of their
absence are discussed below.
6.1.1. Interim reports
In Israel, no interim reports were required prior to 1979. Currently only
semi-annual reports are mandated. The importance of frequent financial
reporting by companies operating in Israel can hardly be exaggerated. Rapid
changes in the structure of the economy and industries, a remarkable popula-
tion growth (an average annual rate of 5% over the last thirty years), and a
high rate of inflation (an average annual price increase of 40% over the last five
years) make the supply of updated information crucial for sound investment
decisions.
6.1.2. Timeliness of the annual financial statements
The ISA requires submission of annual reports within 180 days from the
end of the fiscal year. The SEC permits a delay of ninety days. Furthermore,
most U.S. companies announce their results well before the ninety-day deadline,
whereas most companies in Israel release their annual statements towards the
end of the filing period. The following gives the mean delay (in days) in the
publication of the annual reports of the TASE's companies and of a random
sample of 300 New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange
companies in recent years:
1970 1972 1974 1976
TASE [381 153 155 168 145
NYSE and AMEX [39] 48 42 43 41
6.1.3. Iflation accounting
The extremely high rate of inflation in Israel reduces considerably the
relevance of historically based accounting reports. So far, no disclosure of
inflation-adjusted information is required by the ISA and no recommendations
on inflation accounting were made by the Israeli Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.
The very extensive subsidization of capital by the Israeli government
(particularly of capital investment in industry), produces sizeable net monetary
gains for many companies, which are not reflected in their financial reports.
6.1.4. Business line reporting
Although conglomerates are not so widespread in Israel as they are in the
United States, a considerable number of Israeli companies operate in several
lines of business. Proper analysis of these companies requires separate financial
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information for each segment of the operation. No disclosure of this sort is
required of Israeli companies.
6.2. The accounting profession
The accounting profession plays an important role in shaping the disclosure
system and determihing its success. Although the same framework of account-
ing standards is used in both the United States and Israel, the accounting
profession in Israel is much slower to adapt reporting procedures to develop-
ments in the economy and changes in the operation of individual industries.
The 3,600 certified public accountants in Israel are organized in a voluntary
association - the Israeli Institute of Certified Public Accountants (IICPA). The
Professional Committee of this body is the counterpart of what used to be the
Accounting Principles Board (APB), and suffers from the same weaknesses
that led to the abolition of the latter - low quality of research and preparatory
work, staffing on a part-time basis by very busy practitioners, and inadequate
representation of legitimate views and interests of wide segments of the
financial community. The quantity and quality of the IICPA members are
adversely affected by these shortcomings because important issues such as the
accounting for earnings per share, the definition of extraordinary items,
methods of consolidations, and accounting for leases are not dealt with by any
of the pronouncements handed down by the IICPA. As a result, the Israeli
CPA has to rely heavily for this daily work on accounting principles and
measurement procedures formulated abroad and is often faced with conflicting
pronouncements originating in different countries.
This situation can be traced, in part, to the absence of public pressure on
the profession to be more responsive to the needs of information consumers.
Unfortunately, this indifference among users is due, in turn, to the quality and
timing of financial reports. The accounting profession in Israel does not serve
as a driving force to increase the amount and relevance of financial informa-
tion so as to break out of this vicious circle.
The apparent conclusion from the above description is that regulated
financial information in Israel is lacking in important areas. In a situation like
this, market forces might be expected to stimulate the voluntary production of
information by firms. In fact, ample information was voluntarily supplied by
many U.S. corporations long before its disclosure became mandatory (e.g.
quarterly reports and line of business reporting). This information was sup-
plied, in part, because firms were interested in enhancing the attractiveness of
their stock by reducing the uncertainty and the cost (research, analysis)
involved in investing in it. Israeli corporations, on the other hand, lack any
incentive to provide the public with information beyond the minimum required
by law. This is primarily due to two factors: (a) Israeli firms do not rely on the
stock market for raising new capital, and (b) the TASE regulations permit the
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issuance of common shares with inferior voting rights, thus virtually eliminat-
ing the possibility of a take-over. These factors are discussed below.
Scarce natural resources, insufficient accumulation of wealth, a small
domestic market, and economic limitations imposed by the tense political
situation in the area have made many enterprises in Israel dependent upon
government aid in one form or another, rather than on equity financing. The
massive assistance to these businesses usually takes the form of subsidized
capital. Low interest loans are channeled to many (mostly industrial) firms
based on criteria of location, employment, and export potential. The availabil-
ity of cheap governmental capital reduces private firms' need to become public
and public corporations' need to return to the public for new capital.
Another factor which makes equity financing unattractive to Israeli corpora-
tions is the tax consideration. Most companies in Israel pay company income
tax of about 60% of their income. The tax deductibility of the nominal interest
expense, coupled with a high inflation rate, results in a negative real interest
rate. These borrowing opportunities exist due to the low tax brackets of many
savers.
In addition to the unattractiveness of equity financing, the insensitivity of
Israeli corporations to the interests and needs of small investors can be
explained by the disparity between voting rights and ownership rights (result-
ing from the issuance of inferior shares to the public), which makes share-
holders and managements almost immune to take-over bids.
The conditions outlined above lead to a situation in which most companies
(particularly those in the non-financial sector) are under no pressure to
cultivate and nourish their own shareholders or to cater to the needs of
potential investors. This lack of responsiveness is manifested in various ways,
among them the often poor and erratic dividend record of many companies
and the scarce and untimely financial information provided by them. Press
releases, public conferences, and close contacts with financial analysts are not
considered very important by most managements. The inevitable result is that,
except for the bare minimum required by law, very little information on the
firm reaches the market and, even that, only after considerable delay.
7. Concluding remarks
The evidence provided for the Israeli stock market shows that the results of
the conventional tests for market efficiency are not indicative of efficient
resource allocation. The existence of the weak form or the semi-strong form of
informational efficiency might be a necessary condition, but certainly not a
sufficient condition, for optimal resource allocation. Application of the stan-
dard tests to the TASE reveals that it is informationally efficient: in particular,
consecutive price changes are independent and certain types of new informa-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
D. Givoly" J. Lakonishok / Market efficiency
tion are incorporated into security prices fairly rapidly. In this respect the
TASE is as efficient as major American stock exchanges. In fact, it appears
that despite the apparent differences in the quality of resource allocation, all
securities markets that were investigated exhibit small or negligible serial
dependence (usually negative) between consecutive price changes [40]. Thus,
the standard empirical tests of market efficiency might be useful for the
understanding of the trading mechanism and perhaps for the determination of
the "fairness" of the market, but they fail to provide a meaningful measure of
the optimality of resource allocation.
This article presents evidence which indicates that security prices in the
TASE are often determined by non-economic factors. The causes of this
situation can be traced mainly to the dominance in the capital market of large
banks and the government, to scarcity of corporate information, and to the
investors' lack of sophistication. These conditions are typical of stock markets
in less developed countries. The scarcity of financial information and the
investors' lack of sophistication, though, are elements that are present even in
some security markets of developed countries and apparently inhibit the role of
these markets as efficient resource allocators.
The results indicate that investors and advisors in Israel have difficulties in
understanding accounting numbers. Of particular significance is their failure to
interpret correctly the economic signals produced by these numbers. This state
of affairs imposes added responsibilities on accountants to be educators and
stimulators of information production; whether these roles can be best fulfilled
by enhancing disclosure through professional pressure on outsiders (com-
panies, regulatory bodies) or by more efforts in resolving measurement issues is
a question that should be at the top of the agenda of accountants functioning
in less developed markets.
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